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Introduction
conomic consequences studies have often relied on stock-price-based measures in order to capture the effects of a regulation. 1 While in some cases the effects of a regulation are unambiguously captured by stock-price-based measures, in other cases these effects are not readily discernible, leading to unwarranted conclusions about the effects of a regulation and the overall efficacy of stock-price-based measures. In this paper, we argue that a complementary test of the effects of a regulation is to look at the changing relationship between the resources and revenues of a firm, especially since the effects of a regulation often change the functional relationships between the pre-and post-regulatory period. Conventional estimates of production functions such as Cobb Douglas assume specific functional relationship for estimation purposes. In this study, we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA); as DEA assumes no specific functional relationship, it captures the efficiency effects of a regulation even when functional relationships are changing.
Specifically, this paper uses accounting-based measures to estimate the effects of a regulation upon the firms and the industry. The OSHA Cotton Dust Regulations were used to demonstrate the usefulness of DEA as a means of testing theories of regulation. The choice of OSHA Cotton Dust standards was dictated by the fact that these standards impose 'technology specific input restrictions' on the regulated industry. Additionally, the industry has faced increasingly stiff foreign competition during the post-regulatory period, as the compliance costs imposed by the regulation rose. 2 We hypothesized that compliance costs of regulations will force surviving firms to alter productive equipment by investing in new capital or taking advantage of new sources of scale or scope efficiencies. Our results are consistent with our hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background information regarding the OSHA Cotton Dust standards and stipulates the hypothesis, that is, economic consequences of the regulation. Section 3 articulates the rationale for using DEA in order to test the effects of a regulation; section 4 describes the model and data used in the study; section 5 analyses the results; section 6 assesses the differential effects of the regulation on large and small firms and section 7 concludes the paper.
Economic Consequences of the OSHA Cotton Dust Standards
The evolution of the existing OSHA cotton dust exposure limits followed a sequence of successive events beginning with scientific reports of the relationship between cotton dust exposure and byssinosis and reduced lung function, and regulatory initiatives in the early 1970s 3 (See Merchant 1981; Merchant, Lumsden, Kilbum, O'Fallon, Ujda, Geronimo & Hamilton 1973; Imbus 1974) . By the late 1970s, the very highest levels of all three branches of the US federal government were embroiled in the rule-making process. Numerous articles appeared in the popular press and more specialized sources like The Wall Street Journal, the Federal Register, the Occupational Safety and Health Reporter, and the Journal of Occupational Medicine. Various interest groups including the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Unions (ACTWU), and the American Textile Manufacturer's Institute (ATMI) participated in the rule-making process. In short, cotton dust standards represent an epic example of contemporary industry specific regulation.
Cotton dust regulations apply to a well-defined industry, albeit coverage has varied across industry segments (i.e. yarn production, knitting, classing and warehousing, waste processing, garneting, and cotton seed processing) and will continue to vary over time as more exemptions are granted. Both cotton and noncotton synthetics were explicitly included in the standards. Moreover, occupational illness numbers and incidence rate for dust diseases of the lungs collected by Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1972-1991 indicate positive incidence rates for all of the four digit industries within SIC 2200 and 2300. 4 Because the regulations are applied to a specific industry, both the short and long term, direct and indirect effects of the standard can be isolated to that specific industry or group of firms within that industry. 5 Moreover, the 18-year window contains the whole regulatory cycle from the rule-making process which established the standard in the 1970s to coverage issues and enforcement of the standard in the 1980s.
Previous studies by Maloney and McCormick (1982) and Hughes, Magat and Ricks (1986) employed an event-study methodology based upon the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). By using stock price changes as a measure of changes in firm value which result from a regulatory event in the former study or a series of seventeen regulatory events in the latter study, these efforts have attempted to measure the standard's effects on firm value for very short periods. By examining 1980, the year the standard came into effect, and monthly returns measuring the event's effects upon fourteen textile firms for a 12-month period, Maloney and McCormick (1982) found positive abnormal returns for both cotton and man-made fibre firms. On the other hand, Hughes et al. (1986) , using daily excess returns data and an expanded sample of seventeen events, found that the market value of cotton firms declined by approximately 23 percent.
In a different context, Scherer (1988) contrasted 'event study' methodology which measured the short-term stock price effects anticipated by investors with an 'efficiency' methodology which measured the long term, actual effects of managerial responses. This paper employs accounting-based cost measures to estimate the direct and long run efficiency effects of the standard upon the firm and industry. Unlike the traditional interpretation of a regulation raising the firms' cost of compliance and thereby reducing its profits, Maloney and McCormick (1982) demonstrated that increased profitability can result from a regulation, at least for 4. As Viscusi (1985) noted, data on incidence of byssinosis is at most suggestive if not misleading since the reporting is not broken down into sufficiently finer categories such as grades 1 and 2. 5. Bartel and Thomas (1985) define the direct effects of regulation upon single firms or individuals such as improvements in worker safety or increases in manufacturers' costs that reduce wages and profits. Indirect effects arise out of the asymmetrical impacts of regulation upon different groups of workers or firms.
some of the firms in the industry. Frumin (1983) and Viscusi (1985) argued that regulations forced textile producers to invest in productivity enhancing equipment with reduced costs sufficient to raise profitability. By analysing seven firms, Frumin (1983) Frumin's (1983) and Maloney and McCormick's (1982) , is that some firms' overall efficiency will increase, primarily due to more productive capital equipment which was installed in the industry prior to the upholding of the standard in 1981. Similar results are noted by Dufour, Lanoie and Patry (1998) for the impact of occupational safety and health and environmental regulation in the Quebec manufacturing sector during 1985-88.
Data Envelopment Analysis and Economic Consequences
Economic consequences of a regulation have traditionally been tested using either a cross-sectional regression approach or market model based on CAPM. In this study, we use DEA as an alternative and complementary way of testing the effects of regulation. DEA is used to classify annual revenue generation of firms before, during, and after the regulatory episode in order to measure the actual, direct effects of regulation upon the firms affected by the standard. Although DEA has certain well-known drawbacks, 6 it does possess several distinct advantages over traditional approaches when evaluating the economic effects of a regulation. First, since DEA assumes no specific functional relationships, and one of the effects of regulation is likely to mandate changes in the functional relationship between inputs and outputs, DEA is an ideal tool for such measurement over time. A standard regression approach assumes an invariant functional relationship between inputs and outputs over a period of time and is unable to capture all the effects of a regulation since accommodative structural and/or technological changes may appear as increased and possibly non-random errors in the estimation procedure (Banker, Charnes, Cooper, Swarts & Thomas 1989) .
Second, since most regulations mandate specific production constraints, the effects of a regulatory standard are likely to be in terms of changing the input allocations by managers in an attempt to ward off the potentially adverse effects of a regulation. Changes in managerial allocation decisions are more likely to be reflected in long-term investing and financing than in operating decisions.
6. DEA's drawbacks include a high sensitivity to variable selection, model specification and data errors (Ahn & Seiford 1993) . The dimensionality problem exists, when many variables (dimensions) are specified relative to the number of cases. DEA is a non-parametric technique and does not yield the standard error of an efficiency score (Bauer 1990 ).
Third, traditional tests of the effects of regulation have focused on the informational efficiency of the market since regulations have often been justified on the grounds of market failures (Leftwich 1980) . Irrespective of whether market failure is an adequate justification for regulation, market models, though extremely robust in capturing the informational efficiency of the market, are less likely to capture the managerial efficiency of a firm. 7 DEA can complement the traditional tests of the theories of regulation in as much as it provides more direct evidence regarding the managerial efficiency implications of a regulation.
Fourth, regulatory mandates are frequently preceded by an administrative fiat, that is, due process procedure which allows the parties affected by a regulation to provide input into the deliberation process of the regulators. While such a process might or might not mean an actual capture of the regulators in the classic Stigler's (1971) sense, they certainly allow the affected parties an advantage for softening the stance of regulators, while simultaneously developing accommodative or preemptive strategies in preparation of the worst-case scenario. These strategies are more directly reflected in internal managerial allocations than in the share price of the firm. Arguably, a strongly efficient stock market could discount the value of the firm on the basis of prior probabilistic estimates of the effects of a regulatory event. DEA's focus on internal managerial decisions helps us identify the actual effects of these strategic preemptive moves as they are reflected in the revenue efficiency measures over a period of time. 8
The Income Efficiency Model (IEM).
DEA is a non-stochastic, extremal approach enveloping production observations with a piecewise linear efficiency frontier (constructed from input-output vectors) composed of the 'best-practice' organizations under scrutiny. As such, the additive model of DEA evaluates relative efficiency with respect to minimizing inputs while simultaneously maximizing outputs. This evaluation is performed by comparing each organization or decision making unit (DMU), to an efficiency frontier, constructed by considering all observed DMUs and combinations of the DMUs (See appendix A for technical details).
Data Envelopment Analysis can be applied to any revenue-producing organization by converting publicly available financial performance indicators to their overall efficiency equivalents. One such approach is to disaggregate return on equity (ROE) using the Du Pont method (see Smith 1990; Haag, Haag & Levin 1993) .
ROE, measuring the relationship of net income to common equity, can be decomposed as follows:
In the Coase (1937 Coase ( & 1990 tradition of the theory of the firm, surviving firms are characterised by some firm specific production efficiencies which are unique to the firm itself, else the firm will not survive in the market. 8. Accommodative strategies can be manifested in many forms. For example, regulations that reduce a particular risk may elicit substitution towards other risk enhancing activities. This may apply to both individuals (Viscusi 1994 ) and firms in their response toward a regulation.
where: profit margin = net income(NI)/sales(S); asset utilization = sales(S)/total assets(A); and equity multiplier = total assets(A)/common equity(E).
This decomposition facilitates the examination of ROE in terms of a measure of profitability (profit margin), level of assets required to generate sales (asset utilization), and the financing of those assets (equity multiplier). As such, ROE encompasses measures of sales, net income, total assets, and common equity. The components given in the Du Pont model (sales, net income, total assets, and common equity) define important efficiency dimensions of a revenue producing organization. That is, according to the Du Pont model, total assets, sales and common equity can be minimized as inputs, and net income can be maximized as an output. An income efficient firm maximizes net income subject to constraints of total assets, sales and common equity. This view identifies an efficient firm as having used a minimum of resources, yet producing a maximum of net income. Because DEA generally does not work with negative numbers, the approach of explicitly modelling net income (losses) may not be appropriate. 9 Our alternative approach minimizes the long-term resources of total assets and common equity, and short-term resources as embodied in costs, but maximizes sales. In this way, financial ratios, commonly used to assess the financial performance of a firm, are systematically incorporated into an operational definition of income efficiency. Thus, the DEA equivalent of the IEM measures the success of long term investing and financing decisions as well as short term operating decisions.
An additional component that must be considered when modelling the effects of a set of events on an entire industry is the competitive impact of imports. 'Imports for consumption' are those products coming into the country that will directly compete with the products of a given industry and as substitutes for domestically produced products will have a negative effect on total revenues (the output). Because of this, imports are treated as a 'competitive input'. That is, an industry during a given year is relatively more efficient than other years if it can hold levels of assets, common equity, costs, and revenues constant (or even decrease inputs and increase outputs) in light of increasing imports. Therefore, in DEA modelling, imports are categorized as 'competitive inputs' that are maximized. 10 Thus, imports are directly incorporated into the assessment of revenue efficiency which is measured by the DEA model. 11 The input-output components of modelling the income efficiency of the textile industry are given by: Minimizing:
Input #1 -assets (Compustat item #A6) Input #2 -common equity (Compustat item #A60)
9. Lovell and Pastor (1995) suggest an alternative pre-scaling technique that must be used when data contains zero and/or negative values. See the appendix. 10. Mathematically, competitive inputs are modelled as outputs (maximized). Likewise, competitive outputs, if they exist, would be modelled as inputs (minimized). 11. Hughes et al. (1986) used indirect evidence of high import supply elasticity in interpreting that the standards did not lead to large price increases; thus large compliance costs should lead to lower profitability.
Input #3 -costs (Compustat item #A12-A172)
Maximizing: Input #4 -imports for consumption(competitive), Output #1 -revenues (Compustat item #A12).
These variables, with the exception of imports for consumption, were compiled from the COMPUSTAT. The Standard Industrial Classifications (SICs) 2200, Textile Mill Products, and 2300, Apparel and Other Products, comprise the two broad industry categories directly affected by the cotton dust regulations. Imports for consumption were obtained from US Commodity Exports and Imports as Related to Output for the corresponding time periods.
In this section we have used the Du Pont model to identify where the changes in efficiency may occur from the implementation of an economic regulation. Further, we operationalised the IEM as a DEA equivalent for measuring these efficiency adjustments of the firm. By analogy, these efficiency effects also can be identified at the industry level by aggregating the firms. In the next section, the IEM is applied to several definitions to the textile 'industry', and by comparing years, aggregate industry efficiency is measured using annual data.
Analysis of the Results.
When using IEM to measure the effects of regulation over time on a given industry, the years in which observations are made are treated as DMUs. In each analysis, a given year of the specific aggregated group of textile firms is treated as the DMU. In the test year the relative temporal efficiency of an industry is evaluated as a deviation from the efficient frontier comprised of the most efficient years. In this application, 18 years (1974-91) were examined which included seven preregulation years and eleven post regulation years . Tables 1 and 2 and figures 1 through 4 summarize the general results of two groupings of firms, 'surviving firms' and the 'industry', for the two SICs, 2200 and 2300. The 'surviving firms' represent those firms that were continuously classified by COMPUSTAT to be within SIC 2200 and 2300 over the 19-year period. The 'industry' is comprised of all those firms which are found in the SICs 2200 or 2300 in a given year. Firm membership in an industry may vary greatly into and out of the two COMPUSTAT (SIC) classifications for various reasons including self reported changes in lines of business, reorganization, acquisition, sell off, or outright bankruptcy. However, membership of the firm in the 'surviving' category was held constant over the 18-year period in order to facilitate efficiency comparisons. Both groups of firms, the 'surviving' firms, an 18-year longitudinal group of identical members, and the 'industry' group of firms comprising various members in a given year, were compared to assess the efficiency changes attributable to the evolution of the dust standard.
The stability index measures the magnitude of simultaneous input/output changes or perturbations that are required to change the year's efficiency classification of efficient to inefficient or inefficient to efficient. The stability index of an efficiency classification, or equation 2 (technically defined in the appendix), represents a DEA equivalent measure of revenue efficiency. Given that a firm is inefficient and off the frontier, the stability index measures the extent of the minimum perturbation (i.e. a simultaneous proportional increase in revenue and decrease in resources) required to move an inefficient year to become efficient. Stability indexes of inefficient years appear with a negative sign. Given that firm is classed as efficient and on the frontier, the stability index measures the minimum perturbation (i.e. a simultaneous proportional decrease in revenue and increase in resources) required to move an efficient year to a revised frontier with that efficient year removed from the frontier. A large positive index value indicates a robustly efficient classification. An index value near zero (positive or negative) indicates a firm requires only a small perturbation to change its efficiency classification. Finally, a large, negative index value indicates a robustly inefficient year, which would require a relatively large simultaneous perturbation of revenues and resources in order to move that firm towards the efficient frontier. By using the Table 1 , columns 2 to 5 and figures 1 and 2 report the stability indices or θs for the 'surviving firms' classification during the whole period, 1974-91. During the pre-regulatory period, 1974-80, the firms were virtually efficient since most of 12. There have been other methods suggested for distinguishing between DMUs that determine the frontier (Thompson, Dharmapala & Thrall 1994; Lovell, Walters & Wood 1994) . However, the method used here overcomes many of the difficulties encountered by earlier sensitivity techniques while simultaneously introducing a new branch of descriptive analysis to DEA theory (Charnes, Rousseau & Semple 1996 ). 25 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Stability Index 12 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Year Stability Index the θs are negative, or at least very close to zero. During the post regulatory period, 1981-91, we note large fluctuation in efficiency, but the prominent difference expressed as larger positive θs. The larger θs represent the years which were more robustly efficient. For the 'industry' classification, table 1, columns 6 to 9 and figures 3 and 4, the stability indices imply a similar pattern of results: during the pre-regulatory period, the 'industry' is efficient or virtually efficient and during the post regulatory period, the 'industry' often is quite robustly efficient. Significantly, the number of firm reported in SIC 2200 and 2300, table 1 column 6 and 8 and the plot of the number of firms in figures 3 and 4 decline continuously over the entire 1974-91 period. Evidently the successful 'firms' in the 'industry' classification were forced to become more efficient, otherwise firms exited from 2200 and 2300 as evidenced by the annual reduction in the number of firms. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the general results. The post-regulatory means are positive and large compared to the pre-regulatory means which are either slightly negative (inefficient years) or close to zero for 2200 and 2300. The differences in the standard deviations also are noticeably different. The postregulatory periods' standard deviations are all considerably larger than the preregulatory periods' standard deviations. 13 Apparently the post-regulatory years 13 . As a programming technique, DEA's framework is not consistent with statistical inference. Moreover, the statistical properties of the stability indexes are not known and do not approximate any known distribution. In addition, in this time series application of DEA the stability indexes are not independent and may be serially correlated. Although parametric statistics cannot be legitimately employed to describe the differences in pre-or post-regulatory θs, non-parametric distribution free approaches may be used. 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 * α = 0.10 one tail significance; * * α = 0.05 one tail significance; and *** α = 0.01 one tail significance.
Year

Figure 3 SIC 2200 Industry
14. See Federal Register, Vol. 50, No. 240, Dec. 13, 1985 . Maloney and McCormick (1982) recognized that regulation via standards may not impose costs uniformly across all firms. Efficient firms in the industry with low cost of compliance, even in the face of entry or rising imports, could face a situation where prices rise faster than the costs of these firms. 15 Our results confirm that the cost disadvantage was disproportionately borne by the smaller firms. 16 We compare the descriptive statistics of the stability indices for the entire period 1974-91 in table 3, columns 1, 4, 7 and 10. When comparing mean stability index values, the large firms have 'more robust or larger' stability indices than the small firms for all of the columns 1, 4, 7 and 10. This result applies to both the survivor group and the industry group and also applies to SIC 2200 and 2300. However, the medians give a mixed picture. For SIC 2200, columns 1 and 7 are less negative (or larger values) for the small firms, while for SIC 2300, columns 4 and 10 the median stability indexes are larger (or less negative) for the large firms. Significantly, using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests for paired difference between large firms minus small firms yielded z values with mixed signs, close to zero, and not statistically significant.
Differential Effects of Regulation on Large and Small Firms
15. Maloney and McCormick (1982) , use stock market event analysis to conclude that intra-industry transfer of wealth may make regulation desirable for the firms which may be the net gainers. 16. For the 'industry' category, small and large firms were determined on a per year basis using mean total assets for each year as a reference. For the 'survivors' category, the small and large firms were identified by 1991 assets, and the membership of firms was held constant over the period. 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 -0.04 
(8) Vol. 26, No. 1 Feroz, Raab & Haag: INCOME EFFICIENCY MODEL A complete disaggregation of the four classifications of the cotton dust firm groupings into large and small firms and into the pre-regulatory and post-regulatory periods yield interesting results. Evidence from the median stability indexes support the view that the small firms were less robustly inefficient (i.e. from the longer perspective of an 18 year envelope) during the pre-regulatory period than the large firms. Table 3 displays the median stability indexes in columns 2, 5, 8 and 11. In each case the median stability index value for the small firms is less robustly inefficient (i.e. a smaller negative) than the corresponding value for the large firms (i.e. a larger negative). Moreover, the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the paired difference of the large firm's medians minus the small firm's medians have negative z values indicating that the small firm's median stability index is less negative than the large firm's median stability index. Using a two-tailed test in column 2 the z statistic is significant at the 0.05 level, in columns 5 and 8 the zs are significant at the 0.10 level, but column 11's z is not statistically significant. For the pre-regulatory period, these results are consistent with Maloney and McCormick's (1982) assertion that the costs were disproportionately borne by the smaller firms.
The opposite results attain for the post-regulatory period. Following Maloney and McCormick's findings, we expected the larger firms to be more robustly efficient. Using a one tail test in table 3, columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 indicate that the large firms were more robustly efficient than the small firms. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for the paired difference for the large firms medians minus the small firm medians have positive z values indicating that the large firm's median stability index is larger than the smaller firm's median stability index. Columns 3 and 9 have the correct sign, but using a one-tailed test, the z is not statistically significant; however, in column 6 the z statistic is significant at the 0.05 level, and in column 12 the z is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Although not overwhelming evidence, the results do support the claim of larger firms being more efficient than the smaller firms during the post-regulatory period.
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Consistent with the assessment that larger firms were more robustly efficient than smaller firms, is the evidence concerning the number of firms in the industry category within the COMPUSTAT database. For SIC 2200 (table 3, column 8 & 9) , from 1974 to 1991 the number of large firms dropped by five or -24%, while the number of small firms dropped by 35 or -43%. Hence, for the 'industry' as a whole, proportionately more small firms dropped from the 2200 classification than large firms. For SIC 2300 (table 3, columns 11 & 12) , the evidence is mixed. From 1974 to 1991 the number of large firms dropped by 13 or -48%, while the number of small firms dropped by 45 or -46%. Although the absolute number of small firms leaving the 2300 classification is much larger, the percentage change does not indicate that the smaller 2300 firms left the classification at a proportionately higher rate. We conclude, therefore, that for SIC 2200 firms, the larger firms seemed to be more efficient, or at least survive in the 2200 classification better than the smaller firms. For SIC 2300, although the larger firms evidenced greater efficiency, and many more smaller firms left the industry classification, the proportional decline in the number appeared comparable between large and small firms.
Concluding Remarks.
Existing studies of the economic theories of regulation have focused on market measures of informational efficiency. In this study we used DEA in order to capture the firm-and industry-specific measures of relative efficiency. In particular, based on the sample of COMPUSTAT firms, and including the effects of imports, our results suggest that surviving firms benefited from regulations, since technologyspecific regulatory requirements forced out the cost-inefficient firms from the industry that could not invest in mandated capital-intensive technologies or meet the competition from imports. Firms with a relative cost advantage invested in new technologies to be in compliance with OSHA Cotton Dust Regulations. The payoffs of these investments were in terms of increased efficiencies in the post regulatory periods for the surviving firms, as evidenced by our results. In this sense, the regulations were beneficial to the regulated firms, since the investment in technologies rewarded those firms with an added competitive edge in the face of increased foreign competition.
Our results also suggest that the regulation benefited the large firms more than the smaller subset of firms, which lost more members over the time period under consideration than the larger firms. Although our definition of industry membership is constrained by COMPUSTAT classification changes into SIC 2200 and 2300, we believe that the overall trend of smaller firms exiting the industry at a faster rate than larger firms is evidenced by our data. The effects of regulation on firms that exited the industry is also an interesting issue. However, because of data limitations we have not been able to identify the effects of regulation on firms that exited the industry.
Finally, as we indicated earlier, our model directly incorporates imports for consumption as a competitive input. Earlier studies documented the importance of controlling for imports for consumption in measuring the effects of regulation. However, in a market model, the effects of imports are assumed to be impounded in the stock price of the firm affected by the regulation. DEA as a tool provides for a more direct way of capturing the effects of systematic macroeconomic factors such as imports that affect the efficiency of the firms.
(Date of receipt of final transcript: November, 2000.
Accepted by Robert E. Marks, Area Editor.)
where: i = the general index of n DMUs; and
= the transposed vector of outputs and inputs for a particular unit, denoted as DMU j .
Each DMU is tested for technical efficiency by comparing its component vector to the empirical production possibility set (PE). If no other component vector, observed or hypothetical, in PE consumes the same or less input while simultaneously producing more or the same output, with at least one strict inequality, then the DMU is deemed technically efficient. Those DMUs not meeting the above criteria are deemed technically inefficient. Figure 5 provides a graphical depiction of a set of DMUs for a single-input single-output example. From figure 5, DMUs #1, #2, #3 would be technically efficient while DMUs #4, #5, #6, and #7 would be technically inefficient. Segments 12 and 23 comprise the efficient frontier. Equation 2 represents the stability index cell size and also simultaneously increases inputs and decreases outputs to arrive at an optimal solution. Because equation 2 defines simultaneous detrimental perturbations (increases to inputs and decreases to outputs), the larger the stability index the more 'robustly' efficient the DMU is. Figure 6 provides graphical depiction of the ∞-norm measure (stability cell) for efficient DMU 2 with the stability index, θ, represented by the dashed line within the stability cell.
Figure 6 Stability Cell for Efficient DMU 2
Similarly, a stability index can be calculated for each inefficient DMU. The stability index for an inefficient DMU defines the largest cell in which simultaneous perturbations (decreases to inputs and increases to outputs) will cause the DMU to remain technically inefficient. For that reason, it is desirable for inefficient DMUs to have small stability indices. The stability index for inefficient DMU j is determined by solving the following linear program: Vol. 26, No. 1 Feroz, Raab & Haag: INCOME EFFICIENCY MODEL -89 -Again, observe that equation 2 simultaneously decreases inputs and increases outputs to arrive at an optimal solution. Also note in the analysis to follow that it is customary to negate the stability index values for inefficient DMUs. Figure 7 provides a graphical depiction of the ∞-norm measure (stability cell) for inefficient DMU 7 with the stability index, θ, represented by the dashed line within the stability cell.
Figure 7 Stability Cell for Inefficient DMU 7
Once the stability index is known for each DMU, the DMUs can be ranked from most robustly technically efficient to most robustly technically inefficient. In our time series application a DMU represents a year, rather than a firm, and therefore years can be ranked from highest to lowest based on the stability index values. • 4
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